The Isle of Man Government's intention, as was the case in the United Kingdom, is that there should be a lead-in time to allow Government Departments and Statutory Boards to renew all their legislation and practices and to allow for the training of staff. In the United Kingdom the lead-in time was about two years and the Isle of Man Government propose a similar lead-in time for the Isle of Man.
POSITION BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT
What is the position in the meantime?
Before the substantive provisions of the Act become law references to the European Convention will be limited to three main areas:
(1) Those in which it is necessary to resolve an ambiguity in a Manx statute;
(2) To assist if there is uncertainty in the common law of the Island; and (3) To inform the exercise of a discretion.
This short note poses the following the question: is the subject matter in area 3 above limited to judicial discretion (as in O 'Callaghan v Teare 1981-83 MLR 103 -' the O'Callaghan case') or does it also extend to administrative discretion? 
PREVIOUS REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN ISLE OF MAN LAW
The it was appropriate that they should adopt a policy, which conformed to treaty obligations as far as possible, while at the same time being consistent with Manx law.
In Sallis v R (1987-89 MLR 329 ) the Staff of Government Division accepted that in some cases of allegations of gross indecency between consenting males in private and they emphasised the word some it may be right for the Deemster to remind the jury that whilst the question of whether an act was one of gross indecency or not is one of fact for them to decide, they should have regard to views prevailing in other civilised countries, and in particular they should have regard to the views of the European Court of Human Rights.
In R v Gray (1990-92 MLR 74) an Acting Deemster was unimpressed by submissions in respect of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 'by which the Island is bound' (page 89) and also Article 14 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil Rights. The Law (1996) , Chapter III, 'Nature and Sources of Manx Law' pages 82 -156, and pages 127-151 re: European Convention, which endeavours to summarise the position prior to the Act coming into full force).
WAS THE STAFF OF GOVERNMENT DIVISION CORRECT IN REFERRING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION POINT?
Were the Staff of Government Division in the Jones case (as repeated in the Galloway case) correct to indicate that the Convention could be referred to 'to inform the exercise of an administrative discretion'? Or should they have deleted 'administrative' and inserted 'judicial', or should they have simply added the words 'or judicial' after the word 'administrative'?
On Frankland (1987-89 MLR 65 ) principles do we treat the English decisions, such as the House of Lord's Brind case (which appear to limit the reference to judicial discretion rather than administrative discretion) as highly persuasive, or do we follow the Jones case and the Galloway case (are they clear decisions to the contrary) ? Should the Isle of Man courts follow the comments of the Judges of Appeal in the Jones case and the Galloway case and allow the Convention to be referred to 'inform the exercise of an administrative discretion'? Or should the Isle of Man courts follow the comments of Lord Bridge in the Brind case to the effect that to do so 'would be a judicial usurpation of the legislative function'?
The author's own view, for what it is worth, is that we should follow the stance taken by our Staff of Government Division (the Island's Court of Appeal) in the Jones case and the Galloway case rather than the stance taken by Lord Bridge in the Brind case. We should allow reference to the Convention to inform the exercise of judicial and administrative discretion.
If allowing reference to the Convention to inform the exercise of administrative discretion is considered unacceptable, the fall back position would be to accept that the human rights context is relevant to whether the relevant body exercising the administrative discretion acted reasonably and had regard to all relevant considerations. To limit reference to the Convention to inform only the exercise of judicial discretion would appear to be an unduly restrictive stance to take.
The administrative/judicial discretion debate will be academic as soon as the substantive provisions of the Act come into operation but in the meantime the Island' Globalisation and private international law: reviewing contemporary local law by Olusoji Elias P rimarily because territory necessarily features as an important basic denominator for cross-border interaction across national legal systems, there is a clear material affinity between private international law and the legal dimensions of globalisation. They both have a common root, firstly, in factors, characteristics and considerations concerning the scope of relevant laws, and also in the context and the terminology of localism and externalism. The complexity and the inclusive bearing of globalisation pose contemporary problems, and a recognisable broadening of the scope of private international law to meet the realities of a rapidly globalising world keeps with world-wide trends in which trans-national laws form an important primary focal point, whether or not as they are
